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POST-DISASTER TAX LEGISLATION:
A SERIES OF UNFORTUNATE EVENTS
ELLEN P. APRILL†
RICHARD SCHMALBECK††
ABSTRACT
When a disaster strikes the United States, Congress typically feels
heavy pressure to enact legislation, including tax legislation, to
provide relief. This Article discusses features of two tax legislative
initiatives, which responded to two quite different disasters: first, the
response to the devastation of the fall 2005 hurricane season and,
then, the response to the earlier terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon of September 11, 2001. The Article first raises
the possibility that some of the provisions of these acts may be
vulnerable to indirect constitutional challenge under the Uniformity
Clause. In examining some of the problems inherent in post-disaster
tax legislation, it discusses the role, usually unfortunate, of sympathy
in tax legislation. It goes on to consider how, despite the fact that the
targets of relief legislation are generally thought to be people in need,
it nevertheless seems to be the case that a good deal of the benefits of
disaster legislation in the tax area goes to relatively high-income and
high-wealth taxpayers. It asks whether a better approach can be
institutionalized. It suggests that Congress identify those provisions
enacted in response to the recent disasters that make sense generally,
such as five-year carryback of net operating losses, and amend the tax
code to adopt these rules generally. It further recommends that
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Congress identify those provisions needed in particular when a whole
area is devastated—a five-year period for replacing destroyed
property, credit for wages to pre-disaster employees, and routine
extensions of filing deadlines—and make them available to any
declared disaster area. It urges as well two kinds of longer-term
approaches. One is to consider and evaluate disaster tax relief
provisions as a kind of national insurance against disasters that the
private market does not supply. The other is to develop off-the-shelf
provisions to be activated when a disaster strikes.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, when a disaster strikes the United States,
whether a natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or an
unnatural disaster such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon in 2001, Congress typically feels heavy pressure to enact
legislation to provide relief. Among the tools available to Congress in
discharging these perceived obligations is the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.). But there are substantial problems with the tax legislative
solutions Congress typically crafts under these circumstances.
First, any relief comes slowly, for the federal legislative process is
not built for speed. Congress must be in session, or called into one if it
is not. Bills must be drafted, considered, and approved by the relevant
committees—in the case of tax legislation, the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Care must be
taken to comply with special rules that apply to tax legislation.1 After
debate and vote in each house, the bills must ordinarily be considered
by a conference committee to resolve differences between the House
and Senate versions, and then each house must separately approve
the conference version of the bill.2 Finally, the president must find a
free moment in the Rose Garden for the signing ceremony, at which

1. For example, the Constitution requires that revenue legislation originate in the House
of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Also, the Senate has imposed supermajority
requirements on legislation that would permanently lose revenue under the so-called “Byrd
Rule,” which was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as section 313 and
made permanent in 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13214, 104 Stat. 1388-621, 1388-621 to 1388-622
(1990) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2000)).
2. See JURISDICTION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND HISTORICAL NOTE,
H.R. REP. NO. 108-810, § C (2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/About.
asp?section=23 (“The committee on Ways and Means has responsibility for raising the revenue
required to finance the federal government. This includes individual and corporate income
taxes, excise taxes, estate taxes, gift taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes.”).
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point the congressional work is finished, except perhaps for the
technical corrections bill that will follow to fix the errors that seem
3
unavoidably to infect the process, especially when done in haste.
Second, when Congress does eventually take action, it tends to
overreact. There appears to be a legislative imperative, a felt need to
be seen by constituents as engaged actively in providing whatever
relief or succor within the imagination of Congress, and within fairly
elastic budgetary constraints. In such an atmosphere, the powerful
House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees are likely to
assert their role, involving tax benefits as an element of any disaster
relief package. Moreover, indirect relief through special tax
provisions, known as tax expenditures,4 may be perceived, however
inaccurately, as both self-executing and less costly than direct
governmental grants.
This congressional imperative is encouraged by the fact that the
IRS, at least in its own view, lacks statutory authority to provide
certain types of relief, no matter how much such relief seems merited
by the circumstances. Finally, because post-disaster tax legislation is

3. For example, just prior to passage, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act was amended to
include a large technical corrections title. Pub. L. No. 109-135, §§ 401–413, 119 Stat. 2577 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.). Section 403 clarifies key rules relating to
alternative minimum tax elections and effective dates for nondeferred compensation plans,
provides technical corrections to the U.S. production activities deduction, and spells out other
technical corrections related to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (an act which was
corrected prior in the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2004).
4. Tax expenditures are “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 297 (1974). See generally
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). The Joint
Committee on Taxation has explained, “[s]pecial income tax provisions are referred to as tax
expenditures because they may be considered to be analogous to direct outlay programs, and
the two can be considered as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy
objectives.” STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 2 (Comm. Print 2006). The
Government Accountability Office recently undertook a study of tax expenditures and found
that “[s]ince 1974, the number of tax expenditures more than doubled and the sum of tax
expenditure revenue loss estimates tripled in real terms to nearly $730 billion in 2004.” U.S.
GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL
FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED, at first unnumbered page (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05690.pdf. For 2006, the Joint Committee on
Taxation estimated the cost of the mortgage interest deduction at $69.4 billion and the exclusion
from income for employer contributions for health insurance premiums and related exclusions
at $90.6 billion. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 33, 39 (Comm. Print 2006).
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typically viewed as something that will almost certainly pass Congress
by wide margins, it can be an attractive place to put provisions that an
individual legislator or interest group wants enacted, but which would
be controversial if offered in any other context.
But while the forces inclining Congress to enact post-disaster tax
legislation are compelling, the legislative output that results (we will
argue) has been disappointing, and largely inconsistent with sound tax
policy. Curiously, the usual explanations of why legislation may be
inconsistent with optimal public policy do not seem to apply in this
situation. Conventional public-choice analysis—a currently popular
and usually reliable source of why legislation goes bad—emphasizes
self-interest as the moving force in political processes. Elected
5
officials seek first and foremost to assure their own reelection. That
may involve actions that appeal to their constituents,6 but even when
it does, that is simply viewed as a case in which the self-interests of
the constituents achieve congruence with those of the legislator, more
or less accidentally.7
Ironically, disaster-relief legislation typically embodies a large
and undeniable element of genuine altruism, at least on the part of
the general public. A legislator representing South Dakota knows—as
do her constituents—that South Dakota is unlikely to be devastated
by a hurricane,8 and unlikely as well to be a prime target of terrorist
attacks. The legislator also knows, however, that her support of relief
measures for disasters of those types will be popular with her
constituents. Unfortunately, the temporary displacement of selfinterest by altruism does not seem to produce better legislation; it just
produces legislation that is bad in different ways.

5. As Professors Farber and Frickey have put it, legislators are portrayed in this literature
as “single-minded seekers of reelection.” DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 20 (1991) (quoting D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974)).
6. Or, equally relevant, the legislators’ actions may appeal to their campaign contributors,
who may or may not be among their constituents.
7. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 5, at 22–23.
8. No state is completely free from natural disaster risks, but the risks faced by South
Dakota are probably largely from tornadoes, whose damage can be intense, but never
approaches the scale of major hurricanes, and thus never receives the degree of legislative
attention under discussion here. See Allen Kenney, JCT Staff Member Suggests Automatic
Provisions for Disaster Relief, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 2, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 211-6
(citing Thomas Barthold of the Joint Committee on Taxation, who noted in a speech that recent
tornadoes in Missouri caused intense devastation, but no legislation).

02__APRILL_SCHMALBECK.DOC

2006]

POST-DISASTER TAX LEGISLATION

11/14/2006 8:30 AM

55

Although altruism may play a refreshing role in motivating
Congress to enact post-disaster tax legislation, such legislation
nonetheless needs to be tested against the standard criteria for good
9
tax policy: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and economic efficiency.
Horizontal equity requires treating those similarly situated in the
same way so “those with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal
10
amounts of tax.” Vertical equity requires treating those differently
situated differently so that “people with greater income . . . pay
greater amounts of that income in tax.”11 Efficiency “requires that a
12
tax interfere as little as possible with people’s economic behavior.”
These tax criteria demand that, whatever the role of the federal
government in expressing sympathy to victims on behalf of the
nation, any expression should be designed not to burden the poor,
favor the rich, or fail to achieve its economic goals.
We begin in Part I by discussing features of two tax legislative
initiatives, which responded to two quite different disasters: first, the
response to the devastation of the fall 2005 hurricane season and,
then, the response to the earlier terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon of September 11, 2001. In Part II, we explore
the possibility that some of the provisions of these acts may be
vulnerable to indirect constitutional challenge under the Uniformity
13
Clause. Part III examines some of the problems inherent in postdisaster tax legislation. This Part first discusses the role, usually
unfortunate, of sympathy in tax legislation. It goes on to consider
how, despite the fact that the targets of relief legislation are generally
thought to be people in need, it nevertheless seems that a sizable
share of the benefits of disaster legislation in the tax area goes to
relatively high-income and high-wealth taxpayers. Part IV suggests
9. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27–29 (5th ed. 2005).
10. Id. at 27. The scholarly debate about the validity and usefulness of these criteria is
beyond the scope of this paper.
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. Professors Graetz and Schenk continue:
A tax often is said to be efficient when it promotes economic growth and inefficient
when it inhibits such growth. Finally, efficiency sometimes refers to the extent to
which incentive provisions provide benefits to taxpayers other than the intended
beneficiaries. Where, for example, an unintended third party receives a benefit, or
where the intended beneficiary receives less than the government loses in tax
revenue, the tax provision is said to be inefficient.
Id. at 29.
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“All Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.”).
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that a better approach can be institutionalized by incorporating some
of the legislative and administrative measures that we think have
proven appropriate and helpful. We conclude by offering our
speculation regarding ways in which the incentive structure might be
altered to encourage only relief actions that seem likely to promote
good policy, both in terms of disaster relief and tax policy.
I. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RECENT DISASTERS
Much can be learned from the congressional response to two
recent disasters: the 2005 hurricane season (including Hurricane
Katrina) and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We do not
attempt a comprehensive analysis here of the several tax enactments
spawned by these two disasters. Rather, we have chosen a few
representative features of each that illustrate Congress’s unfortunate
tendency to disregard sound tax policy criteria when responding to
disasters.
With respect to hurricane relief, the shortcomings primarily
implicate horizontal equity concerns between taxpayers within and
without the designated geographic zones. With respect to the
terrorist-attack response, the primary problem relates to a confused
application of the special tax rules designed for military personnel to
civilian disaster victims. In both cases, other concerns are identified as
well.
A. The Three Sisters: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma
1. Catastrophe and Response. The congressional reaction to the
devastation wreaked by the 2005 hurricane season illustrates several
of the troublesome tendencies noted in the introduction. The
immense scale of the damage done by Hurricane Katrina created an
urgency that presumably led Congress to move on legislative relief as
quickly as it reasonably could; nevertheless, the legislative process
was glacial in comparison to the dire needs developing on the ground.
Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana and Mississippi coastline on
August 29, 2005.14 Two weeks passed without legislative action; the
Senate then slightly beat the House to the draw, introducing S. 1696

14. Transcript of Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Aug. 29, 2005),
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/29/acd.01.html.
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15
16
on September 13. The following day, H.R. 3768 was introduced.
17
Two days later, both bills passed their respective houses. To shorten
the process, however, the Senate later that day voted to adopt the
House bill, but with some amendments. Further amendments
followed, but without formal conference committee consideration.18
Both the House and the Senate passed resolutions on September 21
adopting the final provisions of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief
Act (KETRA).19 The enormous strength of the legislative imperative
mentioned above is demonstrated by the fact that, though this bill was
20
in many ways ill-considered, it passed both houses unanimously.
Apparently, even the most maverick legislators, from the safest seats,
did not want to arm their next opponents with the charge that they
tried to block assistance to the victims of this horrific disaster.
The bill was signed by the president two days later, on
September 23. Less than a month thus passed between the disaster
and the tax Act designed to address it. This is remarkably swift by the
standards of tax legislation; still, it demonstrates that tax legislation
can never be much of a first responder in a crisis.
As it happened, however, the hurricane season was far from
over. Even as Congress finally approved, and the president signed,
KETRA, Hurricane Rita was approaching the Gulf Coast, making
21
landfall in Texas and Louisiana on September 24. And a month after
that, Hurricane Wilma—which at times carried the National Weather
Service’s highest hurricane designation, Category Five—circled the
Gulf, eventually hitting the west coast of Florida, where it caused
extensive damage. Congress went back to work—again, at a pace that
one would say was quick for legislation, but slow for disaster relief—
and passed (through both houses) the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of

15. S. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005).
16. H.R. 3768, 109th Cong. (2005).
17. S. 1696 (as passed by Senate); H.R. 3768 (as passed by House of Representatives).
18. E.g., S. 1728, 109th Cong. (2005).
19. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat.
2016 (2005).
20. 151 Cong. Rec. H8197 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2005); 151 Cong. Rec. S10320 (daily ed. Sept.
21, 2005).
21. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, TROPICAL CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE RITA 2 (2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL182005_Rita.pdf
(last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
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22
2005 (GOZA) on December 16, 2005. The president signed it on
23
December 21.
GOZA accomplished several things: it expanded the
geographical reach of the KETRA provisions to areas damaged by
24
the two subsequent hurricanes; it added several important
investment incentive provisions that had apparently not occurred to
25
Congress when it passed KETRA; and it offered technical
corrections to several earlier tax bills, including the Growth Tax
26
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004,27 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005.28
KETRA and GOZA certainly deserve to be called disaster acts,
but the adjective should be understood to refer more to the Acts
themselves than to the hurricanes that spawned them. As can be seen
from the description below, the provisions of the two Acts are, with
only a few exceptions, a sad combination of ineffective disaster relief
and poor tax policy.

2. Provisions of the Acts.
a. Qualified Plan Withdrawals. KETRA’s section 101, the first
29
substantive section of the first Act, seems a logical place to begin. It
allows an individual who, on August 28, 2005, lived in the Hurricane
22. The accepted style of shorthand references to this Act seems to be “GO Zone Act,”
but we have used the shorter acronym because it is shorter, and because it sounds more like a
piece of legislation and less like a cheerleader’s exhortation.
23. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GOZA), Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (2005).
24. Some provisions apply variously to areas hit by each storm, a technical choice that has
spawned a bewildering variety of zone names, including “Gulf Opportunity Zone,” “Hurricane
Katrina disaster area,” “Rita GO Zone,” “Hurricane Rita disaster area,” “Wilma GO Zone,”
and “Hurricane Wilma disaster area.” In all cases, the boundaries of these areas or zones were
to be defined essentially by presidential proclamation. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R.
4440, THE “GULF OPPORTUNITY ZONE ACT OF 2005,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE (Comm. Print 2005).
25. See infra Part I.A.2.e. Technically, GOZA extends several of KETRA’s provisions by
repealing them as of December 21, 2005 (GOZA’s effective date) and reenacting them as part
of GOZA. To be as clear as possible about what Congress did, and when it did it, however, we
will refer to the KETRA provisions when discussing the provisions first introduced into law by
that Act.
26. GOZA § 405 (amending the Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003).
27. GOZA § 403 (amending the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004).
28. GOZA § 402 (amending the Energy Policy Act of 2005).
29. As is typically true, the Act begins with sections giving the Act its name, and providing
definitions. Section 101 is the first section that effects any changes to the prevailing tax rules.
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Katrina disaster area to make withdrawals from various retirement
accounts, such as plans established under I.R.C. sections 401(k),
403(b), or 457, under favorable terms. First, the usual 10 percent
30
penalty on premature withdrawals would be waived. Second, any
income produced by the withdrawals (which are ordinarily taxable in
full) would be included ratably over a three-year period (rather than
31
fully includible in the year of distribution, as is generally the rule).
Finally, any amounts withdrawn pursuant to this provision could be
recontributed to the plan at any time within three years of the
distributions (which is not normally allowed with respect to any
distributions, much less premature ones).32 The Act imposes a few
limits: no more than $100,000 could be withdrawn under this
provision; and only withdrawals between August 25, 2005, and
December 31, 2006 could qualify.
As an emergency relief provision, the provision was unlikely to
be helpful. Many of the victims, including those whose situations were
most desperate, (1) would not have such accounts; (2) could not find
their financial institutions even if they did have such accounts during
the weeks and months following the disaster; and (3) likely did not
have the specter of modest premature withdrawal penalties at the top
of their list of worries at any time.
But as time passed, some progress was made in dealing with the
disaster. People presumably began to be able to locate their various
accounts (if they had them), and may well have found one or more of
the KETRA provisions useful. But, though that was Congress’s clear
intention, it raises an unavoidable horizontal equity question: Why
should taxpayers whose losses resulted from this particular hurricane
be more favorably treated than those whose losses resulted from a
different catastrophe?
b. Casualty Loss Deductions. Before making a head-to-head
comparison between hypothetical victims inside and outside the
favored zones, consider another provision of KETRA: section 402,
which suspends, for losses attributable to Hurricane Katrina, the
limits on casualty loss deductions. These deductions normally allow
deduction of losses only to the extent that such losses exceed ten

30. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 101(b)(2),
119 Stat. 2016 (2005).
31. KETRA § 101(c)(1).
32. KETRA § 101(c)(2)–(3).

02__APRILL_SCHMALBECK.DOC

60

11/14/2006 8:30 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:51

percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in the year of
33
the casualty. This limitation has had the effect of virtually
eliminating eligibility to claim casualty loss deductions for most
34
taxpayers since its inception in 1983.
Again, there is reason to question the effectiveness of this
provision as disaster relief. First, casualty loss deductions are only
available to those who itemize their deductions, a group which
35
consists of only about a third of all taxpayers, and probably a smaller
percentage of Katrina victims, because they were disproportionately
36
poor, while itemizers are disproportionately well-off. Second, there
was not much need to worry about deductions on an emergency basis,
because taxpayers would generally not even be thinking about tax
filings until six months or more after the disaster.37 Finally, the ten
percent limitation was generally less important for Katrina victims,
because their losses were of such a magnitude that they likely would
greatly exceed ten percent of AGI in many cases, especially among
those that seem most deserving of special relief.38

33. KETRA also suspended an apparently trivial limitation allowing deduction only of
losses exceeding $100 per casualty event. KETRA § 402. For personal casualty losses and theft
losses attributed to Hurricane Katrina there is no $100 minimum or 10 percent AGI limitation
under section 402 of KETRA (excluding restrictions in paragraphs (1) and (2)(A) of section
165(h)). Id.
34. In 1982, the last year preceding introduction of this limit, about 2.2 million taxpayers
claimed casualty loss deductions. In the following year, when taxpayers were subject to the 10
percent limitation, only about 200,000 taxpayers claimed such deductions. Susan Hostetter &
Dan Holik, Preliminary Income and Tax Statistics for 1983 Individual Income Tax Returns,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Winter 1984–1985, at 19, 21.
35. Itemized deductions were claimed on 33.7 percent of all returns fled in 2003. Internal
Revenue Service, Tax Stats at a Glance, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102886,00.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
36. It is true, of course, that a deduction for a disaster loss of significant magnitude will
alter a taxpayer’s decision on the question of whether or not to itemize deductions.
37. See KETRA § 403 (extending filing deadlines for victims of Hurricane Katrina).
38. The prototypical pre-1983 casualty was the loss due to collision involving a personal
automobile. If a taxpayer with an AGI of $80,000 totals a car worth $10,000, the casualty loss
limitation disallows the first $8000 of that loss, permitting deduction of only the last $2000, or 20
percent in this example. If a Katrina victim with the same income loses a $150,000 house,
$50,000 of furnishings and personal effects, and a $10,000 automobile, the $210,000 total losses
would have been mostly allowable even without the changes effected by section 402. Only the
same $8000 would have been disallowed, with the balance of $202,000 being allowed, or 96
percent in this example. In the latter case, the effect of the casualty losses in excess of income
would be to allow carryovers of the losses to subsequent years, subject to the rules of I.R.C. §
172.
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c. Illustrating the Inequity. But, at least for a taxpayer who was
reasonably well-off, having perhaps both a substantial section 401(k)
balance, and an income high enough to justify itemizing his
deductions, this pair of KETRA provisions could produce some
significant benefits. Imagine, for example, a single taxpayer with an
income of $90,000, who was perhaps at the periphery of the Katrina
disaster area, and sustained only $10,000 of damage to his house from
a wind-blown tree. He would be allowed to deduct the entire $10,000
of damages, and would be able to withdraw from his section 401(k)
plan the $10,000 necessary to repair the damage. This withdrawal
would be subject to no penalty tax, and would produce no net taxable
income if the individual were able to recontribute the amount back to
his section 401(k) plan within three years. Even if he does not
recontribute, his withdrawal would result in no more than $3333 of
income in the year of distribution.
One must wonder why the benefits—if appropriate in this case—
are not more broadly available to others who are similarly situated. In
the extreme case, imagine another taxpayer identically situated in
every respect except his choice of residence—a taxpayer, perhaps,
who lived in Minnesota, nowhere near the disaster area, and had a
weakened tree blow over on her house, causing an identical $10,000
of damage. This taxpayer will find that if she withdraws $10,000 from
her section 401(k) plan, that amount will be included in her income in
the year of the distribution; and she will pay an additional excise tax
of $1000 for violating the rules discouraging premature withdrawals.
She will also find that, because her income (including the amount of
the premature distribution) is $100,000, all of the $10,000 casualty loss
will be absorbed by the statutory nondeductible floor of ten percent
of AGI. The combination of the extra $10,000 of income, the absence
of the $10,000 casualty-loss deduction, and the premature withdrawal
penalty tax will mean that the Minnesota taxpayer will pay about
$6000 more tax in 2005 than the taxpayer who lived in the Katrina
area39—an amount that results in, under reasonable assumptions,
about a 76 percent larger tax bill than the Louisiana taxpayer faced.40
39. Married taxpayers with an AGI of $100,000 would be in the 25 percent tax bracket.
I.R.C. § 1(a)(1) (2000) (as adjusted for inflation). The extra $20,000 of income would thus be
associated with an additional tax of $5000. This, plus the $1000 early withdrawal penalty, equals
$6000.
40. Married taxpayers with two children would have paid a federal income tax of $7850 if
their AGI was $100,000, they had $20,000 of non-casualty itemized deductions, and a $10,000
casualty deduction. $6000 is 76.4 percent of $7850.
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The two taxpayers suffered precisely the same damage during 2005—
$10,000 of structural damage to their homes due to a wind-blown tree.
One has to ask: Why should their tax treatment be so dramatically
different?
It is possible to justify the KETRA provisions as to casualty
losses and emergency withdrawals from retirement accounts, in the
sense that they do not seem, by themselves, outrageous rules: If one’s
house is suddenly damaged by a storm, perhaps rules allowing full
deductibility of the damages, and tax-free borrowing from one’s
retirement account to cover the repairs, are merciful, even sensible.
On the other hand, it is possible to justify, on different grounds, the
more stringent background rules as to casualty losses and premature
withdrawals that would apply to the Minnesota taxpayer: rules
imposing nondeductible floors on casualty loss deductions expand the
tax base without gross injustice to those suffering modest losses, and
penalizing premature withdrawals from retirement accounts serves to
protect those accounts for later achievement of their intended
purposes. But it is virtually impossible to justify treating two so nearly
identically situated taxpayers so differently.
d. Other KETRA Provisions. Although too numerous to
examine individually, most of the other KETRA provisions also seem
rather capriciously limited to the Katrina disaster zone. They are
rules that either make sense everywhere, or make sense nowhere.
They are not, for the most part, provisions that make sense only
because of some unique characteristic of the Katrina disaster. Two
more abbreviated examples will illustrate this point.
First, KETRA provides an especially favorable mileage rate for
purposes of deductions related to charitable uses of a personal
41
automobile. The general mileage rate that taxpayers may deduct for
use of a personal automobile for charitable purposes is set by statute
42
at 14 cents per mile. In contrast, the rate for business use of a
personal automobile is permitted by regulation to vary according to
prevailing costs of fuel, oil, and other commodities, and is set by
periodic announcement by the IRS.43 For roughly the period covered
by KETRA, the mileage rate allowed for business use of a personal

41. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 303, 119
Stat. 2016 (2005).
42. I.R.C. § 170(i) (2000).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(g) (as amended in 2003).
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44
automobile was 48.5 cents per mile. Congress’s explanation of the
difference is that business use of the automobile should be fully
compensated through a deduction of all costs, including maintenance,
depreciation, and the like, while only out-of-pocket costs, such as the
cost of gasoline, are appropriate charitable deductions.45 Why this
should be so is not self-evident, but justification could perhaps be
found in the income-defining properties of business-expense
deductions. Charitable contribution deductions, in contrast, may be
more properly a matter of legislative grace.
Whatever the reasons for distinguishing business from charitable
uses of an automobile for purposes of deducting the vehicle costs,
KETRA blatantly disregards them by allowing a deduction for
charitable use of a personal automobile—but only within the disaster
zone—at a rate equal to 70 percent of the applicable business rate
prevailing at the time—amounting to about 34 cents per mile during
the fall of 2005.46 If charitable contributions are indeed a matter of
legislative grace, then perhaps one should accept grace when and how
47
one finds it. Still, it is difficult to understand how someone who
drives from Cincinnati to help rebuild a flooded church in southern
Mississippi deserves a more generous deduction than if that person
had driven to Alabama to help rebuild a church destroyed by fire.48

44. Rev. Proc. 2005-78, 2005-51 I.R.B. 1177. This rate was in effect from September 1, 2005,
through December 30, 2005; KETRA was in effect from August 25, 2005, until it was
superseded by GOZA (with this provision intact) on December 21, 2005.
45. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
OF H.R. 3768, THE “KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005,”AS PASSED BY THE
HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON SEPT. 21, 2005 (Comm. Print 2005) (addressing section 303 of
KETRA).
46. KETRA § 303. The section following allows exclusion of any reimbursement of mileage
costs in excess of 14 cents, which, under ordinarily applicable provisions, would be included in
income.
47. Recall here the parable of the laborers in the vineyards, who are paid the same,
regardless of how long they had worked; grace is thus within the discretion of He who bestows
it. Matthew 20:1–16.
48. One might argue that Congress is simply trying to provide particularly powerful
incentives to rebuild the hurricane disaster area because of the extent of the devastation. That
may be an accurate description of congressional motives in enacting this provision, but it is
contrary to the nearly universal refusal to use variable charitable deductions to create
hierarchies among objects of charity. A dollar given to an opera company, for example, is
deductible on precisely the same terms as a dollar given to a soup kitchen, even though relief of
hunger for food would presumably take precedence over relief of hunger for arias in the minds
of most members of Congress (and most voters). The focus of I.R.C. § 170 (which allows
charitable contributions deductions) is on what the donor gives up, not on the worthiness of the
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Second, KETRA adds another exception to the general tax rule
49
requiring recognition of income from the discharge of indebtedness.
Even if the taxpayer is not insolvent (a usual requirement of the
exception from debt discharge income rule in I.R.C. section 108), no
recognition is required if the taxpayer resides within the Katrina
disaster area.50 Again, one can imagine broader exceptions to the
rules regarding income from debt discharge, such as, hypothetically,
allowing exclusion whenever the property securing indebtedness is
destroyed by agents external to the taxpayer. It is, however, difficult
to justify applying such a rule in only one geographical area. To any
particular taxpayer, an uninsured loss of a major piece of property is
likely a disaster, whether it happens in an officially designated
disaster area or not.
e. GOZA Investment Incentives. Except for a few provisions
allowing credits for wage payments, KETRA was not particularly
generous with corporate entities, targeting most of its benefits at
individuals instead.51 GOZA, in contrast, is loaded with provisions
granting tax favors of a variety of sorts to business interests in a
variety of industries. A cynic might conclude that this was due to

charity (as long as the donee meets the definitional standards for eligible recipients of
deductible contributions).
49. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000). The idea behind income from discharge of indebtedness is
that an increase in net worth generates income, and that net worth can be increased by a
reduction of a taxpayer’s liabilities, just as it would be by an increase in the taxpayer’s assets.
50. But there is a nice exception-within-an-exception here: if the discharged debt relates to
property outside the Katrina disaster area, then this exception does not apply. KETRA § 401.
51. Normally, the work opportunity tax credit provides to the employer a credit in the
amount of 40 percent of the first $6000 of qualified work wages per employee, amounting to a
maximum credit of $2400, for hiring individuals from various target groups, e.g., families eligible
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, high-risk youths, ex-felons. Section 201 of
KETRA extends this credit to employers who hire a Hurricane Katrina employee, defined as:
(1) any individual who on August 28, 2005, had a principal place of abode in the core
disaster area and who is hired during the [two]-year period beginning on such date for
a position[,] the principal place of employment of which is located in the core disaster
area, and (2) any individual who on [August 28, 2005,] had a principal place of abode
in the core disaster area, who [was] displaced from such abode by reason of
Hurricane Katrina and who is hired during the period beginning on such date and
ending on December 31, 2005 without regard to whether the new principal place of
employment is in the core disaster area.
KETRA § 201.
In addition, section 202 of KETRA provides a credit of 40 percent of qualified wages (up
to a maximum of $6000 in qualified wages per employee) for the those employers who
conducted a trade or business within the core disaster area who retained their employees that
worked for them in their trade or business.
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another source of delay inherent in the enactment of legislative
solutions: it takes the lobbyists some time to figure out what they
need, and how best to get it. Alliances must be formed, and
compromises must be reached. But one need not be a cynic to
recognize that crafting appropriate incentive structures to rebuild a
completely devastated area takes some time. In any event, by
December 2005, Congress had enacted in GOZA provisions to
benefit a broad range of interests. Utilities, timber interests, oil and
gas producers, and even colleges and universities all will benefit from
52
one or more of the GOZA provisions. Some of those provisions
have a retrospective quality, in the sense that they are intended to
relieve the pain of the losses suffered; but some are primarily
prospective, offering incentives for new investment to rebuild the
areas affected by all three hurricanes.
These incentives take several forms. First, there is a special 50
percent depreciation allowance for qualifying investments to
53
rehabilitate or reconstruct hurricane-damaged property. This means
that in addition to whatever depreciation deductions might be
available for the particular type of property placed in service, the
taxpayer may deduct an amount equal to fifty percent of the
investment in the new or rehabilitated asset. Alternatively, if the
taxpayer elects to expense (that is, to deduct immediately, in the year
the cost was incurred) certain investments under I.R.C. section 179,
he may expense up to $200,000 of investment instead of the usual
52. I.R.C. § 1400N(j) (benefiting public utilities by stating that public utility property losses
caused by Hurricane Katrina may, at taxpayer’s election, be carried back ten years instead of
two years); § 1400(N)(o) (benefiting public utilities by allowing the deduction of GO Zone
public utility property losses from Hurricane Katrina in the fifth tax year before the year of the
loss); § 1400(N)(i)(1) (benefiting timber interests by increasing the § 179 deduction limit of
reforestation costs from $10,000 to $20,000 for small timber producers whose property was
destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and whose property was located in the GO Zone region);
§ 1400(N)(i)(2) (benefiting timber interests by allowing net operating losses for small timber
producers incurred prior to January 1, 2007, to be carried back for five years, rather than the
two years previously allowed); § 1400N(g) (benefiting oil and gas producers by extending the
deduction under § 198 for expenditures incurred to clean up qualified contaminated sites in the
GO Zone through December 31, 2007, and defining petroleum products as hazardous
substances); § 1400(O) (benefiting colleges and universities by doubling the Hope Credit to
$3000 and also doubling the Lifetime Learning Credit percentage from 20 percent to 40 percent
of the first $10,000 in qualified tuition and related expenses, for a maximum Lifetime Learning
Credit of $4000 for students attending undergraduate or graduate institutions in the GO Zone).
These provisions apply to tax years 2005 and 2006. The same income phase out provisions still
apply.
53. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GOZA), Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 2577
(codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(c) (West Supp. 2006)).
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54
limit of $100,000. GOZA also allows expensing of certain cleanup
and demolition costs within the favored zone.55
GOZA also authorizes the issuance of “Gulf Opportunity Zone
Bonds,” which allow states and political subdivisions within the “Gulf
Opportunity Zone” to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance capital
56
investments on generally favorable terms. For example, the
background I.R.C. provisions allow state and local governments to
issue “qualified mortgage bonds” as a means of subsidizing the
construction of housing units, as long as some of the financed units
are reserved for residents who meet certain income limits.57 GOZA
does not eliminate these statistical tests, but rather relaxes them,
making it easier for projects to qualify for favorable financing.
Some of these provisions may be justified by the scope of the
disaster to which they respond, but that is by no means self-evident in
most cases. In at least some cases, if the provision is justified in
helping victims rebuild their businesses in the hurricane zone, it
would be equally well-justified in a small Midwestern town
devastated by a tornado. For example, GOZA’s rules allowing more
remote net operating loss carrybacks (from the normal two years to
five) would seem about equally beneficial, and equally justified, for
58
any business that was destroyed by a catastrophe.

f. GOZA’s Provisions and Special Interests.
GOZA’s
provisions also demonstrate another problem of tax legislative
responses to disasters: it contains many provisions that will benefit
particular business interests that had invested or do invest within the
designated areas. Lobbyists (and those who try to monitor them)
sometimes refer to particular legislation as a “Christmas tree” bill—a
piece of legislation that appears to have beneath its branches a nicely
wrapped gift or two for every industry important enough to have a
trade association. Because the concept is informal, nowhere defined,
and inherently subjective, we do not assert that the disaster-relief bills

54. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(d) (West Supp. 2006)). Expensing under
section 179 is an allowance typically used by small businesses in lieu of depreciation deductions.
It is quite favorable to taxpayers, and its availability and scope are accordingly quite limited.
55. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(f) (West Supp. 2006)).
56. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006)).
57. I.R.C. § 143 (2000) (imposing the requirements necessary for favorable financing).
58. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 172, which provides the background rules on net
operating loss carrybacks, and I.R.C. § 1400N(k), which extends the carrybacks for qualified
losses).

02__APRILL_SCHMALBECK.DOC

2006]

POST-DISASTER TAX LEGISLATION

11/14/2006 8:30 AM

67

can necessarily be characterized this way. And, although the term is
certainly pejorative, bills with benefits distributed broadly among
interest groups are not necessarily bad bills. Perhaps in this instance,
one could say—if it does not push the metaphor too far—that after
the catastrophes suffered in the fall, every industry with a stake in the
Gulf coast region deserved to find a few delights under the tree at
59
Christmas. Still, the profusion of industry-targeted benefits suggests
that legislators intended more than just a careful pursuit of optimal
public policy. It suggests instead that the urgency to do something—
almost anything—in response to a disaster that pulled at the nation’s
sympathies created an atmosphere in which Congress could not say
no.
B. Legislative Response to the September 11 Attacks
1. Chronology. As was the case in the response to the
hurricane season of 2005, the congressional approach to the terrorist
attacks of four years earlier was performed in two Acts. The first,
H.R. 2884, the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001
(VTTRA), was introduced on September 13, 2001—a mere two days
after the attack on the World Trade Center.60 Bypassing normal
procedures, House Ways and Means Committee Chair William
Thomas and ranking Minority Member Charles Rangel sent the bill
immediately to the floor, and the House passed the bill unanimously
61
on September 13, 2001. Despite this nearly immediate response,
however, the tax relief provisions did not win easy passage. Not until
December 20, 2001 did both the House and Senate agree on the
content of the Act.62 It ultimately garnered 129 cosponsors of which
only 36 were Democrats.63 President Bush signed the bill into law on

59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (VTTRA), H.R. 2884, 107th Cong. (2001).
61. Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, House Passes Bipartisan Tax Relief for Terrorist Attack
Victims, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 14, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 179-1.
62. Patti Mohr, Congress Sends Victims’ Tax Relief Bill to President Bush, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Dec. 21, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 246-1.
63. H.R. 2884, 107th Cong. (2001). It ultimately passed the House on a voice vote. Rep.
William M. Thomas, House Passes Victims of Terrorism Relief Act, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 11,
2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 8-37. The Democratic sponsors, however, included such liberal leaders
as Richard Gephardt and Charles Rangel.
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January 23, 2002, more than four months after the September 11
64
attacks.
The delay was due in large part to the Senate’s desire to include
a payroll tax exemption for victims out of a concern that the tax
provisions would otherwise give little or no relief to poorer victims
65
with little or no income tax liability.
Moreover, the House and Senate also postponed passage of tax
66
incentives designed to help rebuild lower Manhattan. Those stimulus
provisions became part of the second act relating to September 11 tax
changes, H.R. 3090, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act
(JCWA). The president did not sign the act until March 9, 2002,
nearly six months after the attack on the World Trade Center. We
discuss the two acts in chronological order below. Like the hurricane
provisions, these provisions raise questions about vertical equity,
horizontal equity, and efficiency, particularly when the victims of
September 11 are compared to soldiers who die in combat and the tax
provisions addressing September 11 are compared to the provisions
of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
2. VTTRA. VTTRA extended income and estate tax benefits
available to members of the armed forces killed in or as a result of
combat67 to three groups: those who died in the September 11 attacks,
those who died in the Oklahoma City bombing of April 1995, and
those who died from anthrax attacks following the September 11
attacks.68 We see in this an interesting pattern—one that can also be
discerned in favorable treatment of victims of lesser hurricanes such

64. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Legislation to Help Victims of
Terrorism (Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/
20020123-20.html.
65. The ultimate compromise was not to give payroll tax relief, but to guarantee each
victim at least $10,000 in income tax relief. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-134, § 692(d)(2), 115 Stat. 2427 (2001). That is, lower-income victims who did not have
income tax liability of $10,000 would receive payments from the government so that the total
relief equaled $10,000. See Sen. Tom Daschle, Senate Concurs with House Amendments to
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 11, 2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 8-36
(“[I]nclud[ing] a provision that did not include payroll taxes but set a minimum of $10,000 so
lower income people would receive some tax refund.”).
66. See Daschle, supra note 65 (quoting Sen. Schumer as refusing “to stand in the way” and
thus willing to permit removing from the bill the part intended to benefit lower Manhattan).
67. See I.R.C. §§ 692 and 2201 (West Supp. 2006).
68. Mohr & Rojas, supra note 61; Rep. Charles Rangel, Rangel Bill to Aid Victims of
Terrorist Attack, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 14, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 179-24.
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as Rita and Wilma: when one disaster is so great that it seems to call
for heavy congressional artillery, other, smaller but more or less
similar disasters get caught up in the wave. This is an understandable
response on the part of Congress: the Oklahoma City and anthrax
tragedies were indeed similar enough to the September 11 attacks to
justify similar treatment, just as Hurricanes Rita and Wilma were
destructive storms similar to Katrina. Had they happened by
themselves, however, they would not have been quite dramatic or
intense enough to produce the response that the September 11
attacks, or, later, Hurricane Katrina, did. (We can only imagine that
in the case of the anthrax terrorism; but we know from history that
there was no immediate relief available for families affected by the
Oklahoma City bombing on a scale that followed the September 11
attacks; similarly, each individual hurricane, even a fairly destructive
one, does not produce its own tax bill.)
Smaller-scale disasters, it would appear, call for dramatic
legislative responses only if they occur within some temporal
proximity to bigger ones, and involve losses that are similar in type, if
not in magnitude. Disasters, however, fall along a continuum of
severity, and the individual victims of smaller disasters, while less
numerous, may be just as deserving (or undeserving) of any special
tax relief as victims of the disasters whose magnitude moves Congress
into action. A more even response to taxpayers who are victimized in
particular ways would be desirable from a tax policy viewpoint.
In the case of the September 11 attacks, the disaster type could
be described as willful terrorist attacks on American soil, with
American citizens as the targets. The September 11 attacks
themselves, alone among the three episodes covered by VTTRA,
were perpetrated by non-Americans, giving rise to a sense of attack
that could be, and inevitably was, thought of as akin to warfare. In
extolling the House bill, Representative Charles Rangel asserted on
September 13 that the families of the terrorists’ victims should be
given at least “all of the benefits we have offered to the families killed
in war zones in the past.”69 Representative William Thomas urged,
it is the least that we can do before we adjourn for this week to put
on record that Members of the House of Representatives, in a
bipartisan way, believe that those victims of those attacks on
September 11 were in a combat zone and should be afforded the

69.

Mohr & Rojas, supra note 61; accord Rangel, supra note 68.
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privileges and protections that are in the code for military personnel
and for civilian personnel because, clearly, this is the first, I believe,
70
substantive reflection of the fact that we are at war.

The war metaphor, while moving and powerful, is nevertheless
misleading. It has had mischievous results in the tax area, as well as
many others. War is an armed conflict between or among nationstates. Terrorism is not ordinarily within this definition. One may
speak loosely of a war on crime, a war on poverty, or a war on avian
flu; but that usage is metaphorical. In the tax area, the metaphor is
unhelpful at best and may have encouraged Congress to ignore
principles of sound tax policy.
Promotion of these tax provisions as integral to a war may have
assisted those who wish to make fundamental changes to our tax
code. Under VTTRA, provisions designed to help lower-income
military personnel, by supplementing military pay, were expanded in
a way that produced large benefits for wealthy victims of disaster. At
least one of these special provisions, relating to the estate tax, may
have served as a pilot for controversial changes sought by some
members, arguably a somewhat backdoor approach to tax reform. A
closer examination of these provisions will make the sources of
concern more evident.
Section 692 of the I.R.C. has long provided that income tax shall
not apply to the income of any soldier who dies in or as a result of
combat zone injury or disease for the year of death and “any taxable
year ending on or after the first day” the soldier served in the combat
zone.71 VTTRA amended this provision to give a similar benefit to the
three specified groups of terrorist victims for both the year of their
death and the preceding year.
VTTRA also gave the victims of terrorism the same estate tax
relief as that extended to soldiers. In the course of consideration of

70. Rep. William M. Thomas, House Passes Tax Relief for Terrorist Attack Victims, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 183-32. Of course, this belief was significantly
less apt in the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, but that seems not to have troubled
Congress—at least not enough to make distinctions among the remedies they crafted in the Act
on this basis.
71. Section 692 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 is the descendant of section 421 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as superseded by section 154 of the 1939 Code. See Rev. Rul.
56-323, 1956-2 C.B. 993. Originally, it was a provision enacted to grant tax relief to soldiers who
died “on or after December 7, 1941, while in active service as a member of the military or naval
forces of the United States.” The provision was to continue in force until “the termination of
[World War II] as proclaimed by the President.” Id.
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estate tax relief, however, Congress changed the nature of relief
granted for the estate tax, both for soldiers and the terrorist victims.
Prior to VTTRA, section 2201 of the I.R.C. had replaced the federal
estate tax that would otherwise have been imposed for active
members of the armed forces killed in action in a combat zone with a
federal estate tax equal to 125 percent of the maximum state death
72
tax credit. Needing to reconcile the provision with the phase-out of
the credit for state estate tax liability that Congress enacted as part of
estate tax reform in June of 2001,73 VTTRA substituted a special
estate tax rate structure for both such soldiers and for victims of
terrorism. Under this special rate structure, the estate tax begins at a
1 percent rate for taxable estates over $100,000 and reaches a
maximum rate of 20 percent when the taxable estate exceeds $10.1
million. (At the time, the general estate tax rates under section 2002
began at 18 percent for amounts over $10,000 and went up to 50
percent for estates over $2.5 million.74)
Thus, VTTRA purported to treat the victims of September 11 in
the same way as soldiers killed in combat for purposes of both the
income and estate taxes. In fact, these income and estate tax
provisions of VTTRA ignore key and relevant differences between
soldiers and the victims of terrorism, particularly victims of the
September 11 attack.
3. Comparing the Victims of September 11 to Soldiers Killed in
Combat. The longstanding special tax provisions for members of the
armed forces, including the special income and estate tax provisions
for those killed in combat, are part of a package designed ex ante to
attract and reward soldiers for a decision to serve voluntarily in the

72. I.R.C. § 2201 (2000) (before amendment by the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of
2001 (VTTRA), H.R. 2884, 107th Cong. (2001)); see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM RELIEF ACT
OF 2001 (Comm. Print 2001) (“The Code also provides a reduction in Federal estate taxes for
taxable estates of United States Citizens or residents who are killed in action while serving in a
combat zone . . . .”). After the estate tax liability is calculated, credits, including the unified
credit of I.R.C. § 2010 and the state death tax credit of § 2011, are then applied to reduce or
eliminate the amount of estate tax payable.
73. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001).
74. Estate tax liability is satisfied up to limits established by Code by a unified credit under
I.R.C. § 2010. Although soldiers and victims of terrorism were given special tax rates under
VTTRA, they remained entitled to the I.R.C. § 2010 credit as determined under the standard
tax rates, I.R.C. § 2201(d), thus further reducing out-of-pocket tax liability.
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armed forces. The Department of Defense “views the federal tax
advantage as part of service members’ cash compensation when it
75
compares military pay with civilian pay.” The military compensation
package includes uniform benefits in the form of health plans,
76
pension plans, death, and disability benefits. The Department of
Defense “relies heavily on noncash benefits because it views benefits
as critical to morale, retention, and the quality of life for service
members and their families.”77 The Department of Defense
recognizes that without such tax and benefit provisions, the United
States government would need to compensate soldiers at a higher
level.
For soldiers, then, these tax benefit provisions reflect a decision
by Congress to use federal funds through tax benefits rather than
through purely monetary compensation. Although these tax
expenditures represent a choice to spend federal funds in one way
rather than another, the cost of paying additional salary would
equally be a cost to the government. Such is not the case for victims
of terrorism who were unwitting casualties of a kind of combat, but
whose income and wealth came from sources other than the federal
treasury and whose employee benefits varied enormously.
Most significantly, these provisions ignore important economic
differences between the two groups. Members of our armed forces do
not constitute a highly paid segment of society. Indeed, our soldiers
are often among the least affluent groups in our society. According to
the Congressional Record, as of 2003 there were approximately
192,000 military families that earned only between $10,000 and
$25,000 per year.78

75. See Derek B. Stewart, GAO Studies Effect of Combat Zone Exclusion, TAX NOTES
TODAY, May 14, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 94-27.
76. According to some press reports, part of the reason for the delay between House and
Senate passage of the bill was the difficulty Senate staffers encountered in trying to provide
civilian victims with the same tax treatment as military personnel when civilian benefit plans
vary so widely. See Patti Mohr, Senate Still Ironing Out Details of Victims’ Tax Relief Bill, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 12, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 198-07.
77. See Stewart, supra note 75.
78. 149 CONG. REC. S7449 (daily ed. June 05, 2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus). As a result
of these low levels of salary, income exclusions can sometimes produce bizarre results. For
example, section 112 of the Code excludes combat pay from income; however, the GAO in 2003
found that the surprising result of the exclusion was that between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers lost
some or all of two benefits designed to help poorer Americans: the earned income tax credit
and the child tax credit. The exclusion of combat income lowered the amount of earned income
below the amount necessary to make the military taxpayers in question eligible for the earned
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Military cash compensation does not generally exhibit wide
disparities, compared to those that might be expected in a similarly
hierarchical civilian setting. The 2004 GAO memorandum explains
that “a junior enlisted member with 3 years of service might earn
around $40,000 in cash compensation, while a senior officer with 22
years of service could earn cash compensation of about $130,000.”79
An enlisted member at grade 9 with 12 years of service would have
80
basic pay of $43,740 for fiscal year 2003. Thus, soldiers, of whatever
rank or seniority, are seldom highly paid. And those who die in
combat are more often young, with low seniority and rank and thus
with low pay.81
In contrast, the victims of terrorism under VTTRA span the full
range of income and wealth possibilities. Indeed, a disproportionate
number of them were people of higher income and wealth. According
to the U.S. Census Bureau, the bottom income quintile of the U.S.
population for 2000 had household income of no more than $17,920;
the top quintile of income for 2000 began at household income above
82
$81,766; and the top 5 percent of incomes started at $145,220. The
Final Report of The Special Master for the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 reports that only a little more than 6
percent of the deceased victims who filed claims had individual
income under $25,000.83 Almost 40 percent of the September 11th

income tax credit. This was not a completely consistent result; other, higher-income soldiers
became eligible for the earned income tax credit because the exclusion lowered their incomes to
a point that they no longer exceeded the ceiling for the credit. See Stewart, supra note 75.
Exclusion of combat pay had similar mixed, and sometimes bizarre, effects on the child tax
credit. Id.
79. See Stewart, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. The youngest and lowest-ranking members of the military have accounted for a
majority of the casualties during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As of September 2006, service
members from pay grades E-1 to E-4 (the lowest-ranking pay grades) represented 50.7 percent
of those killed in the Army, 76.7 percent of those killed in the Marines, and 46.6 percent of
those killed in the Navy. Operation Iraqi Freedom Military Deaths: March 19, 2003, through
September 30, 2006, available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm.
By age, across the branches of the military, 53.2 percent of those killed were less than 25 years
old, and 77.8 percent were 30 or younger. Id.
82. See U.S. Census Bureau, Historic Income Tables—Households, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/income/histinc/h01.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
83. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 52, 97 (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The Census Bureau and the
Final Report define income quite differently. The Special Master of the September 11th Fund
included capital gains, employer-provided benefits, pensions, health insurance, etc. Id. at 30–33.
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84
victims had income of $100,000 or more. Some of the victims were in
fact extraordinarily well compensated, with 25 having had incomes of
$2,000,000 or more. Thus, applying provisions designed for soldiers to
the victims of September 11 gives to the wealthy benefits intended for
the middle class members of our society who have put themselves in
harm’s way.
VTTRA could have looked to an important distinction among
the September 11 victims to make the Act a more reasonable
response to the problem that gave rise to it. Congress could have
distinguished two broad groups of victims: those who were merely in
the wrong place at the wrong time; and those police and fire
department officers whose volitional and selfless exposure to great
risk was indeed heroic, and deserving of approbation and reward. If
Congress had confined the military analogy, and the accompanying
special relief, to those police and fire department personnel who
entered the buildings in rescue efforts, it would have strayed less from
the original intent and purpose of the relief. Although federal tax
favors were not an explicit part of the compensation packages of the
largely local officers involved, the relief would at least have been
targeted at middle-income families of ordinary wealth. It would also
have been sensible in such a case to think of the relief as an
appropriate reward for public service of heroic proportions. Finally, it
would have been much less costly in terms of foregone revenue,
because the individuals and their families would likely have been in
lower tax brackets than many of those inside the buildings, and would
have little if any of their wealth transmission at death exposed to the
estate tax, due to the much lower average sizes of their estates.

4. Comparison of VTTRA and the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund. The September 11 victims were injured and
died for being Americans. The congressional desire to express

The Bureau of Census data, in contrast, defines income as “[m]oney income excluding capital
gains before taxes.” U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS)—Definitions and
Explanations, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2006). Thus, if we were comparing individuals to individuals, the income levels reported by the
Special Master would be higher than those for comparable individuals in the Census data. The
Census Bureau, however, reports household income and the Special Master did not. If
household incomes of September 11 victims were considered, the disparity between the income
level of the general population and that of the September 11 victims would probably be even
greater.
84. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 97.
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sympathy for these victims by compensating them in some way is one
America as a nation shared. The nation, however, expressed this
sympathy and offered compensation apart from and prior to VTTRA.
85
It did so with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which
was enacted, in the words of the Special Master chosen to administer
it, as “a unique response to an unprecedented historical event” out of
86
a “national sense of grief and compassion.”
87
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
which established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
was signed into law by the president on September 22, 2001, and
required that regulations be promulgated within ninety days.88 Thus,
by the time Congress passed VTTRA the following December, it was
well aware that the victims of September 11 would be entitled to
large, individualized awards funded by the Treasury, awards that
89
themselves would be free of income tax liability. The average award
under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund for families of
victims killed in the attacks “exceeded $2 million,” and the total
amount awarded was more than $7 billion.”90
Awards under the Victim Compensation Fund varied with the
victim’s economic situation so that the award from the fund increased
as the victim’s income increased. In the Final Report, the Special
Master queried the statutory approach mandating individualized
awards: “The fireman’s widow would complain: ‘Why am I receiving
less money than the stockbroker’s widow? My husband died a hero.

85. “[U]ltimately, 97% of eligible families who lost a loved one on September 11
voluntarily participated in the Program . . . .” Id. at 80. For discussion of the policy issues
involved in the structure of the Victim Compensation Fund, see generally Stephen Landsman,
Symposium: After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil
Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 205 (2003).
86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 83.
87. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001).
88. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 3–4.
89. Although the awards from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund would
surely have been amounts of damages received on account of physical injury, and thus
deductible under I.R.C. § 104, a separate provision relating to disaster relief payments was
added to the Code by VTTRA. VTTRA, H.R. 2884, 107th Cong., § 111 (2001) (codified in
I.R.C. § 139 (West Supp. 2006)). This provision specifies that gross income shall not include
“any amount received as payment under § 406 of the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act,” which established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. Id. Thus,
VTTRA also excludes from income amounts received by victims’ families from that fund. See
Rev. Rul. 2003-115, 2003-2 C.B. 1052.
90. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 1.
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Why are you demeaning the value of his life.’” Even within a system
of individualized awards, however, the Victim Compensation Fund
had special rules for calculating the economic loss of for those with
income levels above the 98th percentile. “For victims whose income
exceeded the 98th percentile, the Fund calculated a ‘presumed’
economic loss using $231,000 as the income level (i.e., the 98th
percentile income level in the year 2000).”92
Unlike the Victim Compensation Fund, there is no cap,
presumed or otherwise, to the income tax exclusion of VTTRA. In
failing to enact a cap, Congress departed from the limited precedent
regarding income tax relief for victims of terrorism. Congress
provided income tax relief to victims of the terrorist bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, but with a very
different result. In contrast with the unlimited income tax forgiveness
under VTTRA, tax relief for victims of Pan Am Flight 103 was
“limited to an amount equal to 28 percent of the annual rate of basic
pay at Level V of the U.S. Executive Schedule as of December 21,
1988,” which provided tax relief equal “to that which was provided to
personnel of the United States who were on Flight 103, thus providing
equal relief to all of the victims. . . .”93 VTTRA may have responded
to a public need to express further sympathy for the victims of
terrorism, but it did so in a way that favored the wealthy in ways
unnecessary, and arguably counter, to the nature of the nation’s grief.
5. The Incentives in JCWA. The incentive provisions for New
York in JCWA also favor the wealthier, those with capital to invest.
This Act included provisions of the type often proposed for purposes
of economic stimulus. They comprised six provisions: $15 billion of
tax-exempt bonds for property in the “Liberty Zone” of lower
Manhattan; a 30 percent bonus depreciation for certain property in
the zone; a reduced recovery period from fifteen years to five years
for leasehold improvements made to commercial property in the
zone; increased small business expensing for qualifying property used
in the Liberty Zone; extending from two years to five years the period

91. Id. at 82.
92. Id. at 8. Families of high-income earners had the option of seeking a hearing to request
a departure from this computation. Id. at 37.
93. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND
THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 3 (Comm. Print 2001).
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within which a taxpayer can replace destroyed property with similar
property, without recognizing any gain on the destroyed property;
and a new work opportunity credit for certain employees in New
94
York City.
Our criticism of these provisions is that it would be difficult to
find five square miles on earth less in need of enhanced development
incentives than the southern tip of Manhattan, which has a credible
claim to being the business and financial capital of the planet. Tax
incentives of this sort tend to be relatively easily captured in the price
of the real estate; but an artificial boost of the price of this real estate
serves no clear public purpose. The case for conferring such a windfall
on the owners of real estate in lower Manhattan is not obvious, and
95
was certainly not made in the legislative history of the JCWA.
6. Evaluation of September 11 Tax Relief. The September 11
relief raises questions of both vertical and horizontal equity. As noted
above, under VTTRA, the families of these victims of September 11
also receive awards from the Victim Compensation Fund free of
income tax.96 Such treatment parallels the exclusion under I.R.C.
section 104 for compensation for physical injury, and can presumably
be justified by arguments similar to those justifying the latter section.
A troubling defect in the structure of section 104, however, is that
while injury victims are allowed to exclude any recoveries they are
able to achieve (on grounds that the recoveries simply offset earlier,
undeducted losses97), victims who achieve no compensation (because,
for example, there was no tortfeasor, or the tortfeasor cannot be
found), receive no deduction for the losses associated with the
injury.98 The VTTRA provision relieves one inequity at the expense

94. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., SUMMARY OF P.L. 107-147,
THE “JOB CREATION AND WORKER ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2002” (Comm. Print 2002).
95. Similar provisions were enacted in GOZA: tax-exempt bond financing, I.R.C.
§ 1400N(a), additional first-year depreciation, § 1400N(d), increased expensing for qualified
property, § 1400N(e), and a five-year rather than a two-year limit for replacement of property,
§ 1400N(k). They were not highlighted in the earlier section, in part because they seem arguably
more defensible in the context of the widespread physical destruction in southern Louisiana and
Mississippi.
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. The prefatory language in I.R.C. § 104(a) makes clear that to the extent that a
deduction was taken under the medical expense deduction provisions of I.R.C. § 213, no
exclusion is allowable under I.R.C. § 104.
98. Of course, the losses that consist of medical expenses may be wholly or partly
deductible under I.R.C. § 213, depending on the circumstances of the taxpayer.
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of perpetrating another, by allowing the equivalent of such a
deduction (through the exclusion of the award), but only for victims
of the terrorist attacks.
One is left wondering why any victim of a tort or crime who
cannot achieve a recovery through the justice system should not also
be entitled to either excludible compensation, or, at the very least, a
deduction for his uncompensated losses. As with many of the
KETRA provisions, one searches in vain for an explanation of why
some victims should be entitled to more favorable tax treatment than
others. It would not be difficult to adopt a compensation scheme that
would apply with greater generality, and it is difficult to find good
policy justifications for limiting it to categories of victims that are set
by Congress capriciously: If a taxpayer was a victim of the September
11 attacks, favorable tax treatment follows. If the taxpayer was
instead the victim of an ordinary homicide, then no special relief is
available. If a taxpayer’s home was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina,
favorable tax treatment follows. If it was destroyed instead by an
ordinary, nameless tornado, then no special relief is available. But
these categories make little or no sense to taxpayers that have lost
their breadwinners or their homes.
The provisions noted earlier excluding regular income, and
extending favorable estate tax treatment, go well beyond even the
thin justifications of section 104, and seem especially jarring in the
case of those victims who left behind very large estates. We assert that
their families are no more deserving of special tax benefits than the
family of any other victim of murder. Any family that loses a
breadwinner to shocking acts of violence suffers immense damage,
which no recompense can hope to repair. But all are in roughly the
same situation. Special treatment of the September 11 victims can
only be explained by sympathy, but sympathy of a sentimental and
arbitrary form. It does not reflect sound policy analysis.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Up to this point, the arguments in this Article have been framed
largely in terms of what Congress should voluntarily eschew when it
amends the tax laws in response to natural or man-made disasters. It
may be useful to ask, if only for the novelty of doing so, whether the
Constitution allows all of the things that Congress has done to the tax
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99
laws in recent years in response to disasters. This is not ordinarily a
very productive inquiry in the case of federal tax questions, because
the Supreme Court (and the lower federal courts, following its lead)
has rarely managed to find constitutional shortcomings in the federal
income tax laws as enacted by Congress. Even the most notable
exception, Eisner v. Macomber,100 is now generally thought to be
something of a relic, with little continuing validity as a constitutional
101
precedent.
There is, however, a constitutional provision that should give
Congress pause as it enacts tax legislation that applies depending on
where a particular taxpayer lives, or where particular property is
located. The Uniformity Clause of Section 8 of Article I, which, after
conferring on Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises” adds: “but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
102
be uniform throughout the United States,” might well have been
included in the Constitution precisely to prevent legislation of the sort
discussed in this Article. Tax rules that allow, for example, taxpayers
who live in Louisiana to withdraw retirement account funds
prematurely but without penalty to repair wind damage to their
houses, but do not allow taxpayers who live in North Dakota to do
the same, would seem vulnerable to judicial invalidation under this
provision.
In its strongest form, it would seem that this clause would simply
bar any tax enactments that depend on geographical qualifications.
Even in its weakest form, this provision would obligate Congress to
act only pursuant to a reasonable basis for using geographic

99. We are indebted to Larry Zelenak for suggesting that we explicitly consider this
argument, which we had initially neglected, and for his helpful article, Are Rifle Shot Transition
Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563 (1989).
100. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
101. This seems to be so even within the Court itself. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n. v.
Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), in which Justice Marshall describes the realization requirement—
imposed by the Macomber Court as a matter of constitutional imperative in 1920—as being
founded upon “administrative convenience.” Id. at 559.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This clause begins by granting Congress the power to
“collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises,” and concludes by imposing the Uniformity Clause
quoted in the text on only the last three of these. This construction might be read to exclude
“Taxes,” possibly including the federal income tax, from the constraints of the Uniformity
Clause. In an early case following the imposition of our first modern income tax, however, the
Supreme Court rejected this view: “[T]he contention that the [16th] Amendment treats a tax on
income as a direct tax . . . and . . . therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity . . . is . . . wholly
without foundation . . . .” Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916).

02__APRILL_SCHMALBECK.DOC

80

11/14/2006 8:30 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:51

distinctions. Interpreted in this latter, weaker form, it would mandate
precisely the process suggested to Congress by this Article: that it
only make distinctions on geographic grounds when there is a clear
and salient distinction between taxpayers within and without the
boundaries of the geographic distinctions in question.
Thus, if a tax act grants a greater duration for replacement of
damaged property to taxpayers living in areas where the
infrastructure necessary to undertake replacements has suffered
widespread damage, it would (or might) survive scrutiny under the
103
uniformity provision. In contrast, where no meaningful distinction
in circumstances between taxpayers within and without the borders of
a geographically-defined entitlement can be cited, the tax act would
be subject to invalidation. Perhaps, if Congress cannot be persuaded
to undertake this sort of evaluation on its own, this test can be
imposed upon Congress by the courts, acting under the authority of
the Uniformity Clause.
This argument seems far from frivolous; the limited case law on
the Uniformity Clause, however, offers little encouragement to those
who would advance it. The cases are few, presumably reflecting the
fact that Congress ordinarily refrains from enacting tax rules of
geographically limited scope. An influential nineteenth-century
Supreme Court decision involving this question, denoted as the Head
104
Money Cases, related to a modest head tax imposed on owners of
steam and sailing vessels for every passenger disembarking at a U.S.
port who was not a U.S. citizen.105 Cunard Lines (among others)
refused to pay, on the ground (among others) that the tax did not
apply uniformly because aliens entering by train or coach at inland
points of entry were not subject to the tax.
The Court ultimately upheld the statute without conclusively
addressing the Uniformity Clause constraints, finding that “the power
exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. [It is] . . . the mere
incident of the regulation of commerce.”106 Along the way to that

103. See infra Part IV (discussing sensible geographic distinctions).
104. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). This decision was relied upon by the Supreme
Court in two later cases: Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 160–61 (1974)
(interpreting the parallel constitutional provision of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 regarding
uniformity in bankruptcy law); and United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 82 (1983) (involving
the tax Uniformity Clause itself, and discussed extensively below).
105. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 23 Stat. 214 (repealed 1966) (imposing a tax of fifty cents
per person).
106. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595.
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conclusion, however, the Court also noted that a “tax is uniform when
it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
107
subject of it is found.” This suggests that the Court believed that if a
tax that could be, and was, expressed in neutral terms, it would not
fail on the ground that the tax had a disparate impact among
taxpayers living in different states. An otherwise uniform tax on oil
extraction, for example, would not fail simply because taxpayers in
Texas extract a lot of oil, while taxpayers in Maine extract none.
Taxes on oil extraction were in fact the subject matter of the one
Supreme Court decision most closely resembling the issues presented
108
by post-disaster tax legislation. Following a period of price controls
in the late 1970s, Congress and the White House were about to
deregulate the price of crude oil as a means of encouraging
exploration for and development of new oil sources. There was
concern, however, (which now seems rather quaint) about allowing
producers of oil that would have come to the market in any event to
receive the full benefit of the newly uncapped prices. The carefully
engineered result of balancing these competing considerations was
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.109
One of several categories of oil favorably treated under the
provisions of this act was “exempt Alaskan oil,” which was defined in
section 4994(e) as:
any crude oil (other than Sadlerochit oil) which is produced—
(1) from a reservoir from which oil has been produced in
commercial quantities through a well located north of the
Arctic Circle, or
(2) from a well located on the northerly side of the divide of the
Alaskan-Aleutian Range and at least 75 miles from the nearest
110
point on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.

Some producers that paid the windfall profit tax sued for refunds
of taxes paid, and were successful in having the act declared

107. Id. at 594.
108. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983).
109. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229
(temporarily adding I.R.C. §§ 4986–4990).
110. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 77 (quoting § 4994(e)).
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111
unconstitutional in the Wyoming Federal District Court. Direct
appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed, setting the stage for the
first Supreme Court consideration of the limitations imposed by the
Uniformity Clause.
112
The Supreme Court in this case, United States v. Ptasynski,
accepted the dicta quoted above from Head Money Cases as
113
something of a point of departure. But the rule under evaluation in
Ptasynski was not one that had been stated in a geographicallyneutral manner (as it had been in the Head Money Cases), but rather
one that was quite specific about the extraction locations that would
be favorably treated. The Court, however, explained that the Head
Money Cases rule was essentially a one-way inference: while
geographically-neutral language generally would insulate a tax
provision from invalidation under the Uniformity Clause,
geographically-specific language would not lead to automatic
invalidity. Rather, the Court said, “where Congress does choose to
frame a tax in geographic terms, we will examine the classification
closely to see if there is actual geographic discrimination.”114
But not too closely, it would appear. Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell also noted that: “The Uniformity Clause gives
Congress wide latitude in deciding what to tax and does not prohibit
115
it from considering geographically isolated problems.” The Court
had already by this point in the opinion noted that the statutorilydefined term “exempt Alaskan oil” was by no means perfectly
congruent with “oil produced in Alaska.”116 Indeed, the Court noted
that less than 20 percent of then-current Alaskan oil production
117
would be exempt from the tax under the § 4994(e) definition, and
that certain offshore production, beyond the territorial limits of the
state, would qualify for the exemption under that definition, despite

111. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo. 1982) (invalidating the Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax Act in its entirety because the provisions exempting certain kinds of oil
from the tax on impermissible grounds could not be severed from the other provisions of the
Act).
112. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 74.
113. Id. at 82.
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id. at 84.
116. Id. at 77–78.
117. Id. at 77.
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the fact that the oil in that situation could not be said to have come
118
from Alaska.
Perhaps of greater significance was the Court’s view that
Congress had made the findings necessary to justify the geographic
distinctions embodied in the Act:
Congress clearly viewed “exempt Alaskan oil” as a unique class of
oil that, consistent with the scheme of the Act, merited favorable
119
treatment. It had before it ample evidence of the disproportionate
costs and difficulties—the fragile ecology, the harsh environment,
and the remote location—associated with extracting oil from this
120
region.

And that, it appears, was sufficient. Although this examination of
the classification seems more cursory than “close,” it was nevertheless
satisfactory to every member of the Court in this unanimous decision.
Although this certainly is not encouraging for taxpayers who
might wish to challenge, on the basis of the Uniformity Clause, the
narrowness of the disaster legislation’s relief, it may not be hopeless.
The Supreme Court’s summary of the analysis behind the design of
the Windfall Profits bill may have been excessively brief, but there
was indeed a good deal of thought given to the categories created by
that bill. The essential goal of that bill was to burden the production
of oil that would have been brought to market even without price
decontrol, without diminishing the incentives to bring to the market
oil that could not have been feasibly produced under the then-existing
price constraints. The discrimination among categories of oil in that
tax bill, in other words, really was the centerpiece of that legislation,
without which it could not have achieved its purposes.
That is much less self-evident in the case of many of the
provisions of KETRA, GOZA, and VTTRA. Congress did not
consider—or at least did not adequately explain—why it thought it
necessary to allow better treatment for taxpayers in the defined

118. Id. at 78. The significance to the Court of these facts is not completely clear, because it
was nevertheless the case that the geographic range of the favored category of oil was still quite
limited. But the fact that the favorable provision was not confined to a single state, and was far
from comprehensive within the state most favored, seemed to suggest that the category was not
designed by means of political horse trading of the sort that the Court thought the Uniformity
Clause was meant to prohibit.
119. The Court cited STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., THE DESIGN
OF A WINDFALL PROFIT TAX 20–23 (Comm. Print, 1979) in support of this proposition.
120. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85 (internal citation added).
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geographical zones than the background provisions of the I.R.C.
permit to taxpayers who experience similar losses outside of the
favored geographical zones. It would therefore seem that a
constitutional objection based on the Uniformity Clause might still
reasonably be raised.
There may be substantial practical difficulties in this approach,
however, in addition to the uphill battle involved in distinguishing a
recent, unanimous and contrary Supreme Court precedent: A
challenge will necessarily require a taxpayer from a disfavored
geographical area to bring the attack. But, generally, taxpayers lack
standing to attack favorable treatment that Congress may have
121
accorded to other taxpayers. Thus, acts like GOZA, which favor
taxpayers in certain geographic areas but do not by their own terms
specifically disfavor taxpayers elsewhere, are effectively immunized
from judicial scrutiny by well-established standing principles: those
who are favored by a particular provision have nothing to complain
about, while those who are not favored are treated as complaining
about favoritism shown to other taxpayers whose returns the
complainant has no right to dispute. A child’s complaint that her
brother got one more cookie than she may have been allowed some
salience in the court of their mother’s kitchen, but similar claims
relating to tax favoritism that Congress or the IRS bestows on other
taxpayers have fared poorly in the federal courts.
Instead of attacking the GOZA rule directly, a taxpayer seeking
to advance a Uniformity Clause complaint could argue instead that it
is the background rules that have been made invalid by the disaster
act provisions that extend more favorable treatment to certain
taxpayers. But the need to seek that more aggressive remedy puts one
more obstacle in the path of taxpayers seeking relief on a Uniformity
Clause ground. One may reluctantly conclude that this avenue is not
particularly promising, even if in a better, more constitutionally
constrained tax world, it would be.

121. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (2003).
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III. COMMON PROBLEMS IN ENACTING POST-DISASTER
TAX LEGISLATION
A. The Role of Sympathy in Tax
Constitutional issues are not the only ones that complicate the
tax response to disasters. The September 11 attacks and the
Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita unleashed the sympathy of the
American public. For the most part, however, the tax code does not
know what to make of widespread sympathy. A core background
assumption of the code is that taxpayers will act rationally in their
self-interest. The tax law counts on this self-interest to protect the
integrity of the tax system when, for example, it assumes that
property changes hands at fair market value, as long as the sale is
between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts.122
The tax code, of course, does not assume self-interest prevails in
all situations; in particular, the presumption of a certain amount of
intrafamily altruism is more the rule than the exception. The
123
government taxes husband and wife as a couple. It gives exemptions
124
125
for dependents and credits for children. It has established as well a
number of antiavoidance provisions to prevent those for whom the
assumption of self-interest does not hold from taking advantage of
provisions that assume that parties to a transaction have opposing
interests.126
Other provisions make allowance for taxpayers who act in more
broadly disinterested ways. The tax code allows, for example,
charitable contribution deductions under section 170 for giving to the
poor and needy, at least partly on grounds of efficiency—that

122. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (2005).
123. I.R.C. § 1(a) (2000).
124. I.R.C. § 151(c) (2000).
125. I.R.C. § 24 (2000).
126. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a)(1) (2000) (disallowing loss recognition on sales between
related parties). See generally Theodore P. Seto, The Assumption of Selfishness in the Internal
Revenue Code: Reflections on the Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage 4–5 (Loyola Law
School Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-33), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850645 (“Where
[the] assumption of selfishness proves or is likely to prove incorrect, the code makes
adjustments . . . [that] shut down avoidance techniques or otherwise enforce the policies of the
Code.”).
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“charitable organizations receive more in donations than the
127
Treasury loses in revenue due to a tax policy change” or “that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds.”128 Alternatively, it allows the
deduction as a matter of income definition: the consumption
opportunities represented by the gift may be viewed as having been
transferred to others; if those others are appropriate objects of
charitable beneficence, it is likely that their own incomes would make
the consumption opportunities effectively nontaxable because of
personal exemptions, standard deductions, and the like.129
Whatever rationale is offered, the motive for provisions such as
these may be the powerful pull of sympathy, a kind of golden rule for
the tax code, that we should treat others in dire straits as we would
wish to be treated if we found ourselves in the same situation.
Consider our treatment of life insurance. Under section 101, the
proceeds of life insurance are excluded from beneficiaries’ income,
even though in the case of whole-life or endowment insurance
policies, much of the amount received represents a return on the
insured’s investment. Marvin Chirelstein, in questioning the policy
rationale for this exclusion, has observed that “there is a heavy flavor
130
of condolence about the whole affair.”
A flavor of sympathy and condolence surrounds the reaction to
these recent disasters as well. The terrorist acts, for example, gave
“rise to the largest wave of charitable giving in modern U.S.
131
history.” Americans, wherever they lived, whatever their economic
status, identified with the victims of these disasters, who themselves
came from all income levels. Even the very rich were vulnerable. All
of us, rather than being simply witnesses, became interested persons,
and Congress responded with a startling number and variety of tax

127. Don Fullerton & Shira D. Goodman, The Economic Recovery Act of 1981: Implications
for Charitable Giving, 16 TAX NOTES 1027, 1028 (1982).
128. J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS
1938–1861, at 17 (1938).
129. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 344–58 (1972).
130. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 42 (10th ed. 2005).
131. Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources
Under the September 11th Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 591, 594 (2003). Similarly,
private charities raised $3.27 billion to help the 2005 Hurricane victims. Jacqueline L. Salmon &
Leef Smith, Two-Thirds of Katrina Donations Exhausted, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1.
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benefits, including benefits to the wealthy. But such sympathy fits
uncomfortably within the tax code. “When we sympathize with the
other, we open our hearts to his or her subjective predicament, rather
132
than our minds to his or her behavioral choices and preferences.”
Such sympathy distorts tax policy, by, for example, favoring the
temporarily afflicted wealthy over the permanently poor. Sympathy,
although a perfectly respectable sentiment, is probably not best
expressed through financial benefits. Even when it is best so
expressed, it probably should be done in the sort of direct ways that
can more accurately target the benefits in the manner desired, rather
than through the indirect means of tax favors, which can be more
difficult to target accurately.
In the case of September 11 and the Gulf-region hurricanes,
sympathy begat sympathy in a cycle of increasing tax benefits.
Initially, in VTTRA, Congress treated the September 11 attacks as
unique, involving heroes who made a sacrifice for their country—like
our men and women in uniform, rather than as the victims of a
manmade disaster.133 The economic incentives enacted as part of
JCWA, however, became only an opening bid in KETRA and was
met and raised in GOZA.
In these two cases, moreover, sympathy had geographic limits.
The American public did not generalize their concern to all victims of
all crimes or disasters, large or small. When the Red Cross
determined that the needs of the September 11 victims had been met
and wished to put contributions to other purposes, it faced an
enormous public outcry, investigations by governmental officials, and
a forced retreat.134 Americans identified with these particular victims,
not victims generally.135

132. Robin West, Disciplines, Subjectivity, and Law, in THE FATE OF LAW 119, 153 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991). See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (Augustus M. Kelley Publ’rs 1965) (1759) (exploring the long history of the role of
sympathy in the law).
133. See supra Part I.B.3 (noting that heroic designations do not seem out of place as
applied to the police and fire personnel who willingly exposed themselves to mortal risk in the
September 11 rescue efforts).
134. Corey Kilgannon, Red Cross Offers to Refund Gifts for Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2001, at B10.
135. As a recent paper notes, we give “disproportionate sympathy and attention to
identifiable as compared with statistical victims,” with the result that “debate about government
spending and taxation is driven by vivid exemplars—iconic victims and perpetrators—rather
than any rational calculation of costs and benefits.” George Loewenstein et al., Statistical,
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Targeting tax benefits to impacted geographical areas is not new.
But it is only rational if sympathy does not cloud judgment about
whether the needs within a particular geographical area justify special
treatment. Testifying before the Senate Finance Committee when it
136
was considering Katrina relief, George Yin, then Chief of Staff for
the Joint Committee on Taxation, expressed skepticism about such
geographically targeted benefits. Present law, he explained,
provides a model for location specific tax benefits, namely the
provisions known as “enterprise zones,” which offer certain
investment and employment incentives for geographically targeted
areas that are chronically economically depressed. . . . In general,
academic research has been inconclusive as to whether enterprise
137
zones have significantly encouraged employment or investment.

Jane Gravelle, a Senior Specialist in Economic Policy at the
Congressional Research Service, expressed stronger concerns during
138
consideration of the hurricane legislation. Even accepting the
standard arguments for enterprise zones, she doubted that such
arguments could be applied “to rebuilding areas that are not (at least
in their entirety) chronically depressed, but have been destroyed by a
139
natural disaster.”
Congress did not heed these warnings. The combined pressure of
public sentiment and ability to benefit the wealthy as part of package
to relieve the effects of a disaster apparently proved irresistible.
B. The Role of Wealth and Capital in Disaster Response
These disasters produced a perfect legislative storm. Not only did
they provoke a public demand for congressional action, they
permitted those who do not endorse strongly notions of vertical
equity to enact provisions to their liking. Since President Bush’s
Identifiable and Iconic Victims and Perpetrators, 3–5 (Stanford Law Sch. Olin Program in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 301, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678281.
136. George K. Yin, JCT Chief Testifies on Tax Provisions for Disaster Relief, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Sept. 30, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 189-45.
137. Id.
138. See Jane G. Gravelle, CRS Discusses Post-Hurricane Rebuilding Incentives, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Dec. 15, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 240-41 (suggesting that “the principal justification for
intervention may be largely distributional—the desire to help people who have faced a
significant loss to reclaim their lives”); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1362 (1993) (“If enterprise zones merely provide income tax incentives, they will
do little to produce new business and new jobs.”).
139. Gravelle, supra note 138.

02__APRILL_SCHMALBECK.DOC

2006]

POST-DISASTER TAX LEGISLATION

11/14/2006 8:30 AM

89

election, the tax policies of his administration and the Republican
Congress have frequently been criticized for favoring the rich over
the poor. In fact, the disaster relief provisions do the same. Because
they are packaged as disaster relief and thus seen as a response to
tragedies that hurt both rich and poor, they escaped the criticisms that
have been directed at other tax legislation, such as tax rate cuts on
140
capital gains and dividends.
We have discussed earlier how little good tax benefits do for
141
those with little or no tax liability. Similarly, the geographical
investment incentives introduced in JCWA, KETRA, and GOZA
have not been effective in restoring blighted areas, but have been
effective in helping those who have capital to invest. The estate tax
relief provided to the victims of terrorism follows the same pattern.
To extend estate tax relief to these victims distorts the progressivity of
the tax code. As Michael Graetz has written, a primary justification
for the estate tax is “its role in the distribution of the tax burden, in
particular, its role in providing an important element of progressivity
in the federal tax system.”142
The desire of the Bush administration and the Republican party
to eliminate the estate tax, which increases progressivity by taxing the
wealthy, is reflected in the legislative history of VTTRA. Senator
George Allen, Republican of Virginia, proposed exempting victims
from “all Federal death taxes on the estates of any individual killed
during, or as a result of injuries derived from, the September 11, 2001
143
terrorist attacks.” The explanation he offered was that the family of
144
the victims did not need “the added worry of filling out tax forms.”
140. See, e.g., Editorial, Tax Cuts, Again, WASH. POST, May 11, 2006, at A26; Editorial, Tax
Cut Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A36; Kevin Phillips, A Tax Plan Rooted in the
Bush Pedigree, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at M1.
141. And indeed, when, in connection with the hurricanes, Congress attempted to address a
provision designed to help the working poor, the refundable earned income tax credit, it
provided relief so complicated and impracticable as to boggle the mind. Francine Lipman,
KETRA and GOZA: Relief From the Rubble or Another Disaster Waiting to Happen to LowIncome Individuals?, Presentation at the Am. Bar Ass’n Tax Section Meeting (Feb. 4, 2006)
(materials on file with author). Former President Clinton has announced that his foundation is
launching a major initiative to help Katrina victims determine whether they qualify for the
credit. See Clinton Foundation Programs: EITC Awareness Program, http://www.
clintonfoundation.org/cf-pgm-ee-eitc.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
142. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 270
(1983).
143. Sen. George Allen, Allen Bill Would Fully Exempt Attack Victims from Estate Tax,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 27, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 188-42.
144. Id.
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Given such a weak justification, his proposal, unsurprisingly, did not
find its way into the legislation as passed. But President Bush used
the opportunity to score rhetorical points in this ongoing wealthtransfer tax battle: when he signed VTTRA into law, the presidential
release described the law as providing “Lower Death Tax Rates for
Victims,” choosing the name adopted by opponents of the estate tax
145
to describe it. Similarly, the presidential release explains that
VTTRA shields the first $8.5 million of a victim’s estate from the
“federal death tax.”146
At least some of the compromise suggestions offered in “reform”
of the estate tax remarkably resemble the estate tax provisions of
VTTRA: current reports and predictions of possible compromises for
the estate tax speculate on a maximum rate not unlike that in
VTTRA.147 Disaster relief again provided some in Congress with a
means to advance its tax legislative agenda, but to do so with little if
any attention or opposition.
IV. CAN A BETTER APPROACH BE INSTITUTIONALIZED?
The foregoing may suggest that the authors cannot imagine
disaster-relief provisions that Congress ought not either generalize to
a broader range of victims or eschew altogether. That is not the case,
however. There are relief provisions that can be justified by the
special circumstances that surround major disasters, and which vary
somewhat, depending on the nature of the disaster.
KETRA again provides some useful examples. Among its many
provisions are at least a few that seem reasonably tailored to special
needs prevailing within the Katrina disaster area. For example, one
provision extends from two years to five years the period within
which a taxpayer can replace destroyed property with similar

145. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:
THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
146. Press Release, The White House, supra note 64.
147. Thus, for example, at the same time that then-Secretary of the Treasury John Snow
stated that the White House would push for repeal of the “pernicious” estate tax, Senate
Finance Committee Chair Charles Grassley commented that votes for full repeal were not there
and that a compromise was much more likely, suggesting a compromise package of a $5 million
exemption and 15 percent rate. Emily Dagostino, Snow Praises Tax Cuts, Looks Next to Estate
Tax Repeal, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 15, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 93-1.
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148

property, without recognizing any gain on the destroyed property.
(Such gain can occur, for example, where appreciated property was
insured for its replacement costs, which may exceed the taxpayer’s
basis in the property.) This rule seems to respond to a legitimate
difference between property destroyed by a tornado in Missouri and
similar property in Louisiana destroyed by Hurricane Katrina: in
Missouri, a taxpayer whose property is destroyed may be able to find
any number of similar properties by reference to the classified section
of a local newspaper. But if a taxpayer would like to replace a
destroyed shop in New Orleans with another that would continue the
same business, with as much of the preexisting going concern value
(good will among customers, suppliers, etc.), the taxpayer would not,
for some extended period, even have been able to find a newspaper,
much less advertisements for suitable properties in the area. One can
never be sure that a five-year period rather than a two-year period
captures the distinction in need precisely, but at least it is clear that a
longer replacement period is reasonable under circumstances of widespread devastation.
Similarly, KETRA contains a provision that allows prehurricane
employers a 40 percent credit for wages paid to prehurricane
employees who are retained following the disaster.149 This is strikingly
generous in an absolute sense, but again seems arguably justified by
the difficulties of continuing business in an area in which so much of
the basic business infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed.
One can reasonably debate whether some system of direct grants
would have been preferable to the use of a tax credit, but at least this
provision seems reasonably explicable by the special circumstances
surrounding the Katrina disaster.
As we have indicated, it may be appropriate to allow taxpayers
to make withdrawals from retirement accounts to enable them to
afford repairs following disasters, and possibly to replenish those
accounts within some time period following recovery from the

148. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2000) (listing background rules); see also Katrina Emergency Tax
Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 405, 119 Stat. 2016 (2005) (listing
modifications).
149. KETRA § 202. There was no background provision; as the Joint Committee
explanation of the Act dryly notes in its description of present (pre-enactment) law: “There is
no employer tax credit for wages paid solely by reason of such wages being paid by employers in
connection with a disaster area.” STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG.,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 3768, “THE HURRICANE KATRINA TAX RELIEF ACT OF
2005” AS AMENDED BY THE SENATE ON SEPT. 15, 2005, at 13 (Comm. Print 2005).
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disaster. This special withdrawal rule might be tied to the current
rules of section 165(h), which allows deduction of casualty losses to
the extent that they exceed 10 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income. The rule could thus be that if and to the extent that a
taxpayer reasonably believes that repair costs will exceed 10 percent
of her adjusted gross income, she may withdraw such sums from
certain qualified retirement accounts without penalty. This approach
would mean that a taxpayer could make such withdrawals whether
the damage occurred due to a huge natural disaster, a terrorist attack,
or a very localized and relatively unnewsworthy storm, as long as the
amount of economic damage exceeded the stated threshold.
Similarly, not every provision of VTTRA is subject to the
criticisms made in the previous section. Several provisions of that Act
applied to disasters more generally and are, in part for that reason,
somewhat more defensible than the provisions making the victims of
terrorism into soldiers. They too, however, are not free of
problematic aspects.
One important provision in VTTRA supplies a useful example:
section 102 gave the Secretary of the Treasury expanded authority to
postpone deadlines for filing returns, paying taxes, filing a claim for
credit or refund of tax, and other procedural actions.150 This provision
expanded the suspension period from 120 days to one year. It
included within the secretary’s authority a number of filing
requirements related to pension plans and gave authority to postpone
requirements for any other act, such as the time requirement for a
tax-free exchange under section 1031.151 It permitted the secretary to
postpone actions in response to a terrorist or military action,
regardless of whether a disaster area has been declared by the
president in connection with the action. It allows the secretary to
announce such extensions via a notice or other mechanism rather
than requiring time-consuming regulations. This provision,
particularly the longer period of time, proved its use when the
hurricanes struck. It exemplifies a necessary and pragmatic response
to a geographical disaster, where large numbers of taxpayers may be

150. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (VTTRA), Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 102, 115
Stat. 2427 (2001), I.R.C. § 7508A, and new § 518 and § 4002 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974.
151. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001” AS PASSED BY THE
HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 21 (Comm. Print 2001).
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more or less similarly situated, and in need of administrative relief.
Although it is true that individual taxpayers may in some
circumstances also need filing extensions, and similar sorts of
administrative relief, there are mechanisms for providing such
152
relief, and it makes sense that such individual relief be handled on a
case-by-case basis, rather than on the basis of residence within an
area impacted by a disaster.
Another provision, codified as section 139, also applied to
disasters more generally and expanded the Secretary of the
Treasury’s authority to declare a disaster. It excluded from income
not only payments from the September 11th Victim Compensation
153
Fund, but also all “qualified disaster relief payments.” These
include payments for any reasonable and necessary personal, family,
living, or funeral expenses incurred as a result of a qualified disaster,
as well as any payments for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal
residence, or for the repair or replacement of its contents, to the
extent that such repairs or replacements are not covered by
insurance. A qualified disaster includes a presidentially-declared
disaster, or any disaster which results from a terrorist or military
action, an accident involving a common carrier, or from any other
event which would be determined by the secretary to be of a
catastrophic nature. For purposes of payments made by a federal,
state, or local government, it also includes disasters designated by
federal, state, or local authorities. Legislative history also clarified
that employer-controlled foundations could make grants to their
employees to relieve distress from a qualified disaster. So long as the
grants are based on an “objective determination of need” using such
procedures as an independent selection committee, they would not
violate the tax law requirements, including the prohibition on selfdealing, applicable to section 501(c)(3) private foundations.154

152. For example, individuals can routinely request extensions of filing deadlines due to
extraordinary personal circumstances under I.R.C. § 6081, and the IRS routinely grants such
relief. In addition, the IRS is authorized by I.R.C. § 7508A to prescribe periods of up to 120
days during which filing obligations may be suspended in the case of presidentially-declared
disasters.
153. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 111, 15 Stat. 2432
(2002); I.R.C. § 139 (2000).
154. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001” AS PASSED BY THE
HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 17–19 (Comm. Print 2001).
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Section 139 codifies and thus clarifies the amorphous general
155
welfare exception, and Congress did well to think beyond the
immediate terrorist attacks in enacting section 139 and in addressing
problems exposed by the attacks. It makes clear, for example, that
grants from FEMA are excluded from income. It has proven
particularly useful in connection with employer-sponsored private
156
foundations. This sort of legislation represents exactly the sort of
more generalized thinking about tax relief based on special
circumstances that should be encouraged. Congress should consider
all circumstances it can imagine that might deserve relief of particular
sorts, and write rules that can be applied across a range of
circumstances that are similar in salient ways.
Further, these provisions, by allowing administrative invocation
of the predicate for relief rather than requiring congressional action
in each new instance, accomplish two important objectives: First, they
permit relief to be granted within a much shorter response time. As
soon as Treasury officials verify the nature of the disaster, the relief
provisions can be put in place.157 Second, they permit an
administrative process to unfold, under which Treasury can impose
on itself standards and guidelines that will make it more likely that
the relief will be granted in ways that are appropriate to each
situation.
Nonetheless, aspects of section 139 are troubling. By not
excluding from income payments for any expenses compensated for
by insurance or otherwise, it gives an incentive for taxpayers not to
insure for replacement value. By itself, this might be a minor quibble,
in light of the fact that the casualty loss deduction provisions embody
158
the same moral hazard. But the provisions of section 139 go a bit

155. See Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17. In Rev. Rul.
2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B. 1, however, the Service ruled that disaster grants to businesses from a
state program were not excluded from income as a gift, under the general welfare exception or
under § 139.
156. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Designates South Asia Earthquake as Qualified
Disaster, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 26, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 206-8; see also Internal Revenue
Service, Tsunami Deemed ‘Qualified Disaster’ for Tax Purposes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28,
2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 38-6.
157. See supra note 156.
158. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) generally allows deductions for damages, whether repaired or not,
that arise from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty” or from theft. The deduction is subject
to a floor equal to ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, which bars deduction of
relatively small losses. In the disaster scenario, however, the ten percent limitation may be less
significant, in light of the large losses that individuals tend to sustain in those cases.
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beyond the casualty loss deduction rules, leveraging the moral hazard
into new ranges. Although it does not exclude payments in the nature
of income replacement, the legislative history provides that “in light
of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding a qualified disaster, it
is anticipated that individuals will not be required to account for
actual expenses in order to qualify for the exclusion, provided that the
amount of the payments can be reasonably expected to be
commensurate with the expenses incurred.”159 As a result, owneremployees could well use their corporations as a self-insurance
mechanism for their personal disaster relief. That is, rather than
purchasing insurance against natural disasters, owner-employees
could instead make tax-free section 139 payments to themselves if
and when a disaster occurs.
Limiting the exclusion to qualified disasters is also troubling.
Should an employer or an employer-sponsored foundation choose to
provide assistance to an individual employee who lost a home to fire
or storm, section 139 will not protect such payments, because the
disaster would not be a qualified disaster. In sum, in enacting section
139, Congress looked beyond the particular major disaster facing the
country, but did not extend its vision to consider the relevance of its
relief to the individualized disasters that occur each and every day.
Contemplating future disasters, however, leads us to suggest a
procedural change for section 139. Section 139 delegates to the
president or the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to declare
disasters. In an ideal world, this would be sensible, because the
executive branch can act more quickly than Congress ever can. In the
real world, however, Congress will likely always feel that it needs to
act when disaster strikes. In order to preserve a role for Congress,
section 139 and other special disaster provisions should require that
Congress invoke those provisions by adoption of a joint resolution
declaring a disaster. Joint resolutions can be passed quickly in the
face of disaster, and if the substantive provisions so invoked have
been carefully considered in advance, sound tax policy need not be
sacrificed to achieve a quick and dramatic result.
We further urge policymakers to consider a different kind of
justification for disaster aid and thus to develop a different set of

159.

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
“VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND
THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 16 (Comm. Print 2001).
OF THE
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business tax incentives for areas hit by disasters. The Congressional
Research Service has suggested that
aid to devastated areas by the federal government may be viewed as
an implicit form of insurance—the country as a whole acts to spread
the risk of the cost of natural disasters. . . . In particular, the cost to
businesses in a catastrophe exceeds the loss of property (which can
be covered by insurance) because the business also loses its
customer base and work force, and it is difficult for private insurance
160
markets to provide coverage for this type of loss.

The credit for wages to pre-disaster employees we endorse provides
exactly this sort of aid. We recommend that Congress consider other
similar sorts of tax provisions—perhaps a credit for advertising
expenses for some period after a disaster, or accelerated amortization
of section 197 intangibles for preexisting businesses in the disaster
area. Designing tax relief in such a way, rather than enacting a
laundry list of business tax incentives, will help to match the
irresistible congressional impulse to respond to disasters with tax
provisions more directly targeted at the disaster.
More generally, there may be actions that can be taken to
restrain the tendency of Congress toward uneven and somewhat
excessive tax relief in response to disasters. One possible model
would be the one that Congress has, in effect, already adopted with
respect to the costly problem of lost revenue due to inter-company
pricing schemes between and among related taxpayers engaged in
international trade.161 Congress has enacted a very simple and general
rule, only a few sentences long, granting the commissioner authority
in his discretion to restate a taxpayer’s income and expense items “in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income [of
160. Gravelle, supra note 138; see also Terrence Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax
as Implicit Insurance Against Losses from Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 425–26 (2003) (“[T]he
income tax system provides a certain level of implicit insurance, which emanates from
provisions that allow for deduction of losses and, in some instances, deduction of insurance
payments, as well as the exclusion of recoveries from insurance companies or the tortfeasors
themselves.”). Some of the provisions Congress has enacted, such as requiring reduction of taxfree disaster payments to the extent a disaster-related expense is compensated by insurance,
may well be best explained on such a basis.
161. For example, if X Corporation is a U.S. multinational corporation with a subsidiary in
Ireland (which has generally lower corporate income tax rates), it may find that it can
advantageously sell its products to its Irish subsidiary at prices that barely cover its costs,
allowing the Irish subsidiary to resell the products in Europe at higher prices. The profits
derived from the sale of these goods would then appear on the Irish subsidiary’s income
statement rather than the income statement of the U.S. parent.
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162
The Treasury regulations, in contrast, are
the taxpayer].”
163
voluminous. The control achieved over tax avoidance through intercompany pricing arrangements is less than perfect, but one imagines
that it is far better than could be achieved through the more
cumbersome legislative process.
Something similar could be done with respect to tax relief in
response to all disasters. That is, Congress could expand the kind of
authority it has already given to the commissioner to postpone filing
deadlines under section 518 or declare disasters under section 139. It
could delegate to the commissioner not only authority to suspend
filing burdens, but also to toll the running of limitations on
reinvestment of insurance proceeds in similar property, excuse the
imposition of penalty taxes on withdrawals from retirement accounts,
and so on. The Treasury could then promulgate regulations that
would achieve the sort of consistency that the piecemeal legislative
approach to disasters has not, and cannot.
As a general solution, however, this approach seems unrealistic.
The problem exists at least in part because of the “legislative
imperative” discussed at the outset of this Article. Congress
apparently feels vulnerable to possible charges that it has “done
nothing” in the face of a national disaster, and it is institutionally
unable—and increasingly so, it would appear—to resist defending
itself in anticipation of those charges by enacting tax relief provisions,
including ones of types that we have criticized.
A more promising alternative might be to create a panel
involving the staff of the several tax-policy agents within the
executive and legislative branches: in particular, the Internal Revenue
Service, the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy, and the
Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress. The panel, in
consultation with the non-tax federal agencies and Congressional
committees with disaster-relief responsibilities, could be charged with
providing guidelines for tax relief measures that Congress may choose
to consider in response to future major disasters. In particular, we
suggest that such a panel might identify three categories of relief
provisions, more or less along the lines we have indicated in this
Article.

162. I.R.C. § 482.
163. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-0 to 1.482-9, including proposed regulations, run to more than 200
pages in length in 8 U.S. Tax Rep. (RIA).
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The first category would consist of provisions that should
probably be available for all disasters, large and small, on an
equitable basis. As discussed, one such example would be special IRA
withdrawal rules in the case of a disaster and five-year carryback of
net operating losses. The panel would undoubtedly come up with
other possible provisions.
The second category would consist of those provisions that
should rarely if ever be invoked in response to a disaster. An example
of such a provision might be those that effectively exempt estates
from all estate tax liability, regardless of the size of the estate. As we
have explained, there is simply no policy justification for the idea that
the estates of very wealthy decedents should be immune to the usual
estate tax liabilities simply because the decedent died in a particular
sort of disaster.
The third category would consist of things that should be to some
degree customized to fit the particular disaster, but within guidelines
that the panel could develop. For example, we concur with Congress
that the scope of some disasters is such that longer periods may be
necessary for reinvestment of insurance proceeds in property similar
to property that may have been destroyed, because the damaged
infrastructure and heightened local demand for materials and labor
make the standard periods inadequate.164 The panel could develop
guidelines for such customization. For example, it might suggest that
if less than five percent of the housing units within an affected county
or metropolitan area were damaged or destroyed in the particular
disaster, the reinvestment window should not exceed the four years
already allowed in the case of presidentially-declared disasters.165 If
more than five percent but less than ten percent of the housing units
were damaged or destroyed, then the reinvestment period could be as
long as five years.166 Similar rules could be developed for wage credits,
credits for advertising expenses, and section 197 amortization.

164. I.R.C. § 1033 generally allows taxpayers to defer recognition of gain on recoveries
(through insurance or otherwise) with respect to damaged or destroyed property if those
recovered amounts are reinvested in property that is similar to the property that was damaged
or destroyed. The baseline period for such reinvestments is two years under § 1033(a)(2)(B), but
a four-year period is available in the case of presidentially-declared disasters under
§ 1033(h).
165. § 1033(h).
166. We have no expertise in disaster relief, and so we offer these examples with great
diffidence, as purely hypothetical possibilities that might emerge from the panel process.
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Guidelines of this sort obviously produce no more than soft
constraints; Congress would be free to disregard them when it chose,
and it might choose to do so with some frequency. But if even some
constraint is achieved through this process, it would be better than
none at all. Guidelines of this sort would establish presumptions,
obligating a member of Congress who proposes to disregard them to
offer compelling explanations of why it would be appropriate to do
so. The guidelines would also provide some cover for members who
may wish to protect the integrity of the fisc, without undue fear that
they will be portrayed as heartless and uncaring in their next
campaigns for resisting their colleagues’ efforts to create tax
expenditures unwisely. Finally, creation of the panel would by itself
draw some attention to the problem of excessive use of tax relief
measures as a response to disasters, which may have salutary effects
at least in the short run.
CONCLUSION
In our view, the nature of the problem presented explains the
public response. The disasters were vividly, unceasingly presented in
the media day and night; they were easy for the public to understand,
and difficult to put out of mind. The entire nation identified with the
victims and resonated with fear that a manmade or natural disaster
would afflict their own families and communities as well. Enormous
sympathy and anxiety clouded public vision.
That Congress and the public may well have been acting
altruistically—at least, mostly so—did not produce good tax policy.
Citizens and members of Congress, eager and pressured to act, did
not think—and, truly, did not want to think—about the efficacy in
restoring destroyed neighborhoods or the equity of their actions in
that tax benefits would favor the wealthier among those in the
affected areas, rather than less wealthy taxpayers who suffer
individual, isolated disasters. Sympathy, it would appear,
systematically distorts tax policy in this way.
The nation has witnessed at least four major tax acts responding
to disasters in the last five years. It seems reasonable to fear that
Congress is likely to perpetuate this pattern with future disasters
unless the institutional landscape is somehow altered. We have
offered some ideas that we believe would alter that landscape. In
order for Congress to inoculate itself against a distorting sympathy
unleashed by a particular disaster, we urge Congress to take two
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kinds of immediate actions. First, it should identify those provisions
enacted in response to the recent disasters that make sense generally,
such as five-year carryback of net operating losses, and amend the tax
code to adopt these rules generally. Second, it should identify those
provisions needed in particular when a whole area is devastated—a
five-year period for replacing destroyed property, a credit for wages
to pre-disaster employees, and routine extensions of filing
deadlines—and, following the model of section 139, make them
available to any declared disaster area.
We also urge two kinds of longer-term approaches. One is to
consider and evaluate disaster tax relief provisions as a kind of
national insurance against disasters that the private market does not
supply. The other is to convene a panel to develop packages of tax
relief for different kinds of disasters, for Congress to have available to
invoke when needed. We urge Congress to consider these and other
approaches immediately, before another disaster strikes, because they
can be reasonably evaluated only outside the context of any particular
disaster.

